RELEVANCE AND THE INTERPLAY OF DISTANCE AND INTENSITY IN CLAUSEWITZ'S TRINITY
Where more than twenty interpretations hold the field, the addition of one more cannot be deemed an impertinence. Up front, there are two caveats to this essay: First, though there is a great deal of discussion and use of the triangle analogy, it should not be inferred that war can be reduced to a mathematical theorem or equation. As explored later in the essay, a fixation on the inevitable geometric analogy that surfaces when discussing a trinity framework lends itself, and practitioners of the strategic arts, to become polarized on the issue of accepting or rejecting the utility of Clausewitz's theory. This acceptance or rejection is not always based on the merits of Clausewitz's actual assertions but, rather, is based upon the inference that his framework was intended as a mathematical truth.
Once the practitioner makes that leap of abstraction, it is easy to dismiss the trinity as being too narrow in scope. Clausewitz's work, there is ample room for interpretation and the author's biases (e.g., personal and professional experiences) will no doubt impact conclusions. This essay is not, nor is it intended to be, a definitive interpretation of Clausewitz. Rather, this is intended as an alternate lens through which to consider and continue the dialogue on one of the most complex human activities.
Why Clausewitz?: A Brief Analysis
War remains "…an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will" 3 and the ends of war are always connected to a political objective. 4 While relatively simple, this definition is most accurate and compelling because it cuts to the essence of what war is:
a uniquely human phenomenon that attempts to orchestrate the use of force in a fluid and volatile environment to attain a goal. Clausewitz most eloquently captured this concept in his paradoxical trinity composed of passion, reason and chance. 5 His trinity includes the unpredictability of outcomes between the most important variables in the equation of war: humans. Therefore, Clausewitz's work is not intended to be prescriptive, as it is impossible to predict the infinite number of permutations within human interactions. Rather, it is a descriptive tool through which to assess the required relationships between the elements, leaving the specifics of addressing the war at hand to the strategists of the day. Other theorists, while making significant contributions to the field, either inadequately addressed or failed altogether to address one or more of these elements.
Jomini, on the other hand, did offer a prescriptive view of war. His theory of war provided a formula for success in its conduct, reduced war to a series of mathematical equations to be solved. Attempting to establish a formula to address war in a deterministic way minimizes the dynamic of a thinking, uncooperative enemy. Such an approach also ignores the roles of context and the physical environment in war.
Attempting to overlay mathematical certainties onto such a dynamic phenomenon is the equivalent of asserting a theorem of war, not a theory. A theorem is defined by Although Sun Tzu's admonitions included the human element, his writings did not provide the practitioner a repeatable framework through which to analyze the questions of why wars occur and how to effectively use force as a tool. The latter is a fundamental element of success in war. 6 Moreover, Sun Tzu's assertion that defeating the enemy's strategy is paramount, while an interesting concept, is not particularly helpful as a theory for three reasons.
First, assuming knowledge of the enemy's strategy is readily available and reliable is somewhat quixotic. Sun Tzu himself asserted that all war is deception and, in doing so, seems to acknowledge his paramount task is an ideal more than a viable theoretical framework. Granted, Sun Tzu emphasized the need for accurate intelligence through his emphasis on spies. However, he really provided no way of countering the reality that intelligence in war is normally scarce and rarely accurate. only mistaken in their belief that the US forces were Saddam's primary concern, but that the US forces were not even in the top two of Saddam's strategic concern's, those being an internal coup and the threat of a regional rival. 8 While there was arguably not much chance of an Iraqi conventional victory against the overwhelming force fielded against them, this example shows how easy it is to miscalculate the enemy's intent or concerns. By extension it illustrates the difficulty of "knowing" the enemy's strategy to address those strategic concerns, let alone attacking effectively his strategy.
Second, while obviously a consideration, the enemy's strategy is not necessarily the driving force behind "friendly" actions once hostilities commence. Were that the case, continuing with the OIF example above, US forces might have been expected to have spent significantly more time and effort locating and destroying aircraft the Iraqi's hid in an attempt to preserve their air power. 9 The Iraqi strategy, however, was based upon the flawed strategic assumption that the US would not force a regime change.
From the US perspective, the Iraqi Air Force need only be neutralized in order to secure air superiority for the US forces. The US did not attempt to counter Iraqi strategy in this case because it was not necessary. The Iraqis achieved their operational and tactical goals of preventing the destruction of their aircraft, at the cost of surrendering arguably inevitable strategic victory to U.S. forces.
With hindsight it is easy to see such operations would have been a waste of U.S.
resources, not to mention a violation of the principle of "objective" in war. Sun Tzu's emphasis on the enemy's strategy surrenders the initiative to the enemy and, by default, places friendly forces into a perpetual defensive mindset.
Finally, acknowledging it would be preferable to end conflicts without firing a shot, the essence of war involves the application of force, and that aspect is the central focus of Clausewitz's theory. To this point, the discussion has centered on the differences in these three theorists' views that are germane to the author's perspective.
Where it appears Clausewitz, Jomini and Sun Tzu aligned was in their perspective that war was the exclusive purview of the state. 10 It is at this point, given the rise of nonstate actors in today's international environment, the prevailing interpretation of Clausewitz's paradoxical trinity is found wanting, and the roots of the erroneously ascribed limitations are addressed.
A Closer Look at Clausewitz and the Trinity
The first step in addressing the continued validity of Clausewitz's theory and trinity framework for viewing and understanding war is to acknowledge the theory and the trinity are not one in the same. Often, when Clausewitz's name is invoked, practitioners jump straight to the framework without fully taking stock of the theory writ large and erroneously assume the trinity is merely an abbreviated version of Clausewitz's theory. This error is likely due to the difficulty of understanding the Hegelian dialectic in which Clausewitz wrote, and is either the direct result of the concepts being misunderstood or an over-simplification in an attempt at expedience.
Clausewitz's theory on war is a necessarily nuanced discussion of the interaction between people, their emotions and their environment (physical and political) leading up to and during war. The trinity framework is a complementary visual device used to indicate there is a relationship between the three elements, but it is too simple and rigid to be applied independently.
At its most basic, Clausewitz's theory of war is that war is a fundamentally political act intended to bend an opponent to [our] will. 11 More than mere violence, war consists of calculations on both sides for entering into, conducting and concluding the conflict. These calculations make war a uniquely human phenomenon.
If we accept the common definition of war being an act of force between two belligerents, war is, by definition, impossible between a person and an inanimate object or idea. In the "war on crime," for example, the war (if one is actually being fought) is between the government (local, state and/or federal) and the criminal(s). The United
States' current war is not "…on terrorism," but is against the members of Al Qaeda.
Failure to identify the enemy creates confusion, both in the mind of the fielded forces, and in the minds of the public on whom they rely for support, resources and authority.
While this discussion of how the word "war" is misused may seem mundane, it proves illustrative of a basic problem in understanding Clausewitz. This misuse of the word adds to confusion on the subject. The false analogies create apparent voids in the applicability of Clausewitz's theory and framework. In actuality, these "voids" are the result of attempting to assess phenomena other than war through the lens Clausewitz So, understanding the human nature of war, Clausewitz asserted there must be recurring or objective phenomena (e.g., violence, friction and chance) as well as subjective, changing phenomena (e.g., military forces, doctrine, weapons) that will affect war's conduct. 12 From that macro viewpoint came Clausewitz's paradoxical trinity. The trinity is not the theory; it is a conceptual aid through which he asserted his, as well as others', theory should be viewed. In any war, there will always be at least two trinities at work-one for each belligerent. Even in the case of non-state actors, all three elements of the objective trinity (passion, reason and chance) exist. The subjective bodies to which the trinity is applied will, however, be different.
Using Al Qaeda as an example, of a non-state actor engaged in war, it is clear there is a "governing" body that prescribes their vision and cause. This "government" is not elected and is admittedly a much looser conglomeration than a state government. It does, however, constitute the political leadership of the movement. The people in Al Qaeda's trinity are distributed across the global community. They are identifiable only by their espoused beliefs, which is why it is difficult to envision them as a coherent group. Finally, there is no doubt Al Qaeda has a military leadership. They are not uniformed and do not adhere to traditional state boundaries, but the combative component of Al Qaeda's trinity exists and its leadership is largely comingled with the political leaders. 13 Clausewitz spoke to the need for a theory of war to be balanced.
The framework of the trinity was intended to help the practitioner visualize the components to be considered in creating or assessing a theory for a particular war.
By design, the trinity framework is somewhat simplistic; hence an understandable tendency to gravitate to it as the theory and attempt to apply the framework for purposes other than what is intended. An attempt to balance the trinity as either a predictive or preventive tool misses the point of the framework.
As a practitioner evaluates a war, the utility of the trinity framework is in its role as a reminder that the relationships between the subjective and objective elements of the trinity are always in play. An unbalanced theory is not one that evokes an image of anything other than an equilateral triangle. Rather, an unbalanced theory would be one that attempts to circumscribe the trinity, leaving out one of the elements (Figure 1 ) Figure 1 The aforementioned interpretation will no doubt meet with criticism. A common criticism will likely be that the theory lacks "precision," which is a euphemism for "predictive capacity." That criticism would be accurate, but irrelevant.
It is not the role of theory to predict wars' causes; it is a framework to clarify thought on the subject. 14 Such a task is impossible to complete and is exactly what
Clausewitz cautioned against when he admonished that "…establishing an arbitrary relationship between…" the elements of war would render the theory basically useless.
He understood that elements of both the subjective and objective nature of war would change over time. It is easy to discern why, when asked to place an object in the center of three related objects, the image of a triangle comes to mind. A triangle is the only geometric shape in which this situation can be depicted, so there is no significant problem with the shape's use. The first leap of abstraction occurs, however, in the type of triangle typically ascribed.
Clausewitz never specifically discussed the relationship between the elements of this trinity beyond the implied discussion of polarity. There is no substantive discussion of relative strength of relationship. It stands to reason, however, the tensors between the figurative magnets would impact how the relationship was displayed. Said plainly, the intensity/health of the relationships between the elements is important in at least a descriptive, if not prescriptive capacity. Clausewitz, in his discussion of balance stated the theory, not the trinity, must be balanced; the trinity is a framework. That there is a relationship between the elements is all that should be construed as mandatory in Clausewitz's writings.
Representing the trinity as something other than an equilateral triangle, as is the common convention when represented graphically, permits a better description of the conditions under which states embark upon wars (i.e., from where the real impetus for war comes). This can be of assistance in framing the type of war, to include intra-state conflict or factions engaging in trans-national conflict.
Additionally, it is imperative to remember there are at least two trinities in play in any war, one for each belligerent. As the construct of treaties, international law, etc., are overlaid onto this construct, the resultant interaction(s) can look more like a prism than a mere two-dimensional triangle. As anyone who has ever peered through a prism can attest, the resultant refraction can make what was once clear appear distorted or indiscernible. This figurative distortion in using the trinity framework is merely magnified, not negated, when the number of factors is increased by the addition of nonstate actors as significant players in the rubric of war. What is significantly different between the states and their non-state counterparts is the strength and distance between the elements of their respective trinities.
Interplay of Distance and Relationships
All violence, including "trans-national" terrorism, is a local phenomenon in that it occurs within a geographic area (e.g., states) and is typically aimed at correcting a grievance that is at least perceived to be within a government's purview to correct.
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Therefore, it stands to reason that both the system (i.e., other states) and non-state actors are attempting to influence the "reason" or governmental element of the trinity.
Representing this situation graphically and within the geometric analogy of a trinity could be done through a scalene triangle in which the distance of the people from the government and the military leader have "pushed" the impetus for war towards the people. The French Revolution can be used as an example of this phenomenon.
Once nationalistic and revolutionary ideology took hold in revolutionary France, war was no longer the exclusive purview of the aristocracy. Mobilization of the masses not only changed the scope of war, but also its means and goals. People's interest, whether ratified by a recognized state government or the governing body of some less formal group structure, are at the heart of war. That is, the unequal distance pushes the motivation, if not the full means of the state, out of the traditional "state-centric" balanced espoused to be envisioned by Clausewitz (Figure 3 ).
Figure 3
Rather than the people's passion rising and joining the state elements, the force generated is turned against the government. A more contemporary example of this dynamic is exemplified by the Egyptian opposition movement of early 2011.
After three decades of oppressive rule by Hosni Mubarak, there was a grassroots movement in Egypt to reform the government to a more democratic model. 19 Though the initial government response, both in rhetoric and action, was strong and defiant, it quickly became evident to Mubarak (and, subsequently, to the Obama administration)
that the sitting regime could no longer hold power without physically crushing the opposition with military force. However, not only had the political leadership allowed the relationship between the government and the population to wither, the tensors between the government and the military leaders was also strained. 20 While Mubarak himself could not be categorized as a "democratic" leader, Clausewitz admonished that a viable theory must be flexible enough to handle changes to the environment, yet structured enough to be of utility in making sense of the elements. Said another way, the framework must be structured enough to frame the issue, while not so narrow as to constrain a practitioner's thinking. Regardless of whether Clausewitz actually envisioned a scenario where the people were pitted against the government, the fact remains that such a situations exist and the test of durability for Clausewitz's theory and framework is whether or not they are flexible enough to deal with the change in the geopolitical situation; this author asserts they are indeed flexible enough.
At its essence, war is unchanged regardless of the level (i.e., strategic, operational or tactical) or the affiliation of the belligerents. 24 As it remains an act of force to compel the enemy, the requisites required for wars between people and their governments (aside from the basics of weapons, etc.) is enmity over an issue that is perceived to be within at least one party's (normally a formal government) purview to correct. In such a situation, all three elements of the trinity remain in play, however the strength of the relationships may help explain the dynamics. As an example, consider the dynamics of oppressive governments, as it pertains to transnational (non statesponsored) violence, visually represented in Figure 4 . acknowledge that Clausewitz's framework is readily suited for that type of conflict, however, so we move to the discussion of the implications of wars with non-state actors.
It is likely 21 st century wars, particularly from the U.S. perspective as the current sole superpower, will more frequently involve non-state actors or factions of states.
Arguably the most contentious issues with the inclusion of war with non-state actors, in theory and practice, center on legal considerations. Currently, the requisites under the United Nations Charter for a lawful defensive response include necessity, proportionality and immediacy; within realm of necessity fall the criteria to establish both opportunity and intent. As discussed earlier in the essay, the very nature of non-state actors precludes much of the unambiguous warning states at least believe they will receive from belligerent states. This translates to a difficulty legally establishing their intent before an attack, as the precepts of international law and the customs of state-to-state discourse are not set to recognize intent absent an overt demonstration (which in most cases will be the attack). By extension it is problematic for states to justify attacks as defensive and within the rights of self-protection. Taking the war with Al Qaeda as an example, the organization had been vocal in their intent to attack the U.S., but it was not until the attacks of September 11, 2001 Problems arise largely because the operations necessarily have to take place within someone's sovereign territory, the majority of the population of which is not "at war."
Additionally, there is a tendency to view states, typically having a conventional asymmetric advantage, as acting excessively when engaged with a numerically and technologically disadvantaged opponent. 28 From the discussion of issues with the entrance into and engagement in hostilities with non-state actors extends a natural discussion of the termination of said hostilities.
War termination with non-state actors will be problematic, as the element of reason normally ascribed to the government is not vested in a sovereign. The obvious question is "with whom does a state discuss terms and conditions of war termination?"
Assuming such an agreement could even be discussed, there remains the issue of diplomatic engagement with a non-state entity-particularly a terrorist group. Avoiding the loaded term of "negotiate," any attempt to bring to terms such a group, that has not officially authorized any single person or body to enter into discussions on their behalf, is destined for failure. The logical conclusion is that many of these wars may increase and decrease in intensity, but are unlikely to come to a definitive end in the classic sense of state vs. state wars. There is precedent for extended conflicts that go "cold"
and rise and fall in intensity, the Korean Conflict probably being the most notable.
However the point is, again from a US perspective, these wars will be extremely unpopular. They will fly in the face of what can arguably be called the American way of war, and both the people (passion) and government of the state (reason) will therefore heavily resist entry into them.
Conclusion
While obviously not a panacea, there is still a great deal of applicability for Clausewitz's theory and the attendant trinity framework in the 21 st century. Providing a clear operational definition of both the phenomenon of war, as well as understanding the purpose of the trinity framework (a complementary visual device) and theory (a far more complicated and nuanced discussion) are the first steps to applying this body of knowledge. Admittedly, the current geopolitical scene is more volatile than when Clausewitz created his theory. However, the continued value of the trinity is in its ability to focus the strategic practitioner on the few "constants" that are present in war. The technological changes and the legal constructs of the 21 st century have no doubt brought the ability to engage in violence to new heights and distributed that ability across a much wider swath. Also, the interdependence of the 21 st century world has sped up, if not complicated, the consequences of war. However, these are all issues of warfare; the nature of war remains stalwart. As such, the elements of passion, reason and chance also remain and their attendant contextual factors must be addressed strategy, regardless of the scope or the nature of the participants.
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